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This paper attempts to explain the determinants of the propensity to armed struggle and the 
probability of participation by individuals in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria using primary 
(micro) data. While grievance appears to be pervasive among individuals and communities in the 
region and can be systematically explained, neither the grievance level nor its commonly-cited 
causal factors appear to be strong enough to create a disposition towards armed rebellion.   
Rather, factors that reduce the opportunity cost and risk of participation or increase the 
perceived benefits appear to be more important.  The study identifies three of these factors that 







This  paper attempts to explain the determinants of the propensity to armed struggle and the 
probability of participation by individuals in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria using primary data 
from a sample of 1,337 individuals drawn from 18 communities in the region. Nineteen variables 
are used to capture factors that reflect motives and opportunity for rebellion and a logit regression 
model is used to estimate the propensity to armed struggle in the population.   
 
About 36 percent of the sampled population revealed a willingness to take up arms, which 
translates to a potential rebel army size of about 24 percent of the male population in the states 
covered.  While grievance appears pervasive and is systematically explained by the data, neither 
the grievance level nor its commonly-cited causal factors, appear to be strong enough to create a 
disposition towards armed rebellion.  Rather, factors that reduce the opportunity cost and risk of 
participation or increase the perceived benefits appear to be more important. Three community-
level and five individual-level characteristics are particularly found to increase conflict risk in the 
region. Oil-availability, longer distance from state capital and absence of government presence 
makes a community a haven for would-be rebels. The propensity to armed struggle also increases 
in lower income level, lower educational attainment, lack of asset or asset-immobility, if an 
individual is unconstrained by a marital bond, or is from the dominant ethnic group.   Three of 





















Empirical studies have established a causal link between natural resource abundance and civil 
conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), for example, show that natural resource-
availability/abundance considerably increases the chances of civil conflict in a country.  A 
country that has no natural resources faces a probability of civil conflict of 0.5 percent, whereas a 
country with a natural resources-to-GDP share of 26 percent faces a probability of 23 percent.  De 
Soysa (2000) observed a similar correlation between resource wealth and civil conflict; while 
Addison and others (2003) note that in Africa as well as other developing regions countries with 
point resources such as minerals have a high propensity for conflict ranging from high levels of 
political violence to outright wars. Ross (2004b) provides similar evidence linking mineral 
resources in general to civil conflict.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) and  
Fearon (2005) however argue that the risk of civil war is limited to oil.  
 
There are reasons why oil-dependence is particularly risky.  Oil and many other minerals generate 
large location-specific rents for the states or groups that can control the territory where resources 
are located. Dependence on such rents also exposes them to shocks arising from world price 
volatility, discoveries and exhaustion. These (rents and shocks) create multiple routes that link to 
civil conflict and are particularly large in the case of oil (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005)
1. It has been 
shown that oil-dependent countries have a particularly high risk of experiencing secessionist civil 
wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002c; Ross 2003b, 2004b) (Table 1).    
 
According to Ross (2003a), most mineral-related insurrections have four elements.  First, the 
people in the region have a distinct ethnic or religious identity which set them apart from the 
larger population before resource exploitation began. Second, they share the belief that the central 
government was unfairly appropriating the wealth that belong to them, and that they would be 
better off as a separate state. Third, the local people generally bore the greater part of the cost of 
the extraction process in terms of land appropriation, environmental damage and the immigration 
                                                 
1 Ross (2004a), Humphreys (2005) provides detailed treatment of the mechanisms by which resource-
dependence leads to conflict. 
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of labor from other parts of the country, and commonly argue that they have not been sufficiently 
compensated for these costs. Finally, the intensity of conflict (the cost in terms of lives and 
money) has been higher when the extraction process is susceptible to “hold-ups” by local people.  
The author cites recent conflicts in Colombia, Sudan and Indonesia (Aceh) that reflect these 
dynamics.   
 
Apparently, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria
2 contains these key ingredients for a mineral-based 
conflict (Ross 2003a). The region is the source of most of the country’s oil reserves (Table 2).  It 
is populated by minority ethnic groups that have borne a disproportionate share of the cost of oil 
extraction for which they believe they have not been adequately compensated and an equally 
higher share of government repression. And the spread of oil platforms, pumping stations, and 
other oil installations and infrastructure across the region provides an opportunity for locals to 
express their dissatisfaction by blocking the extraction process.  Furthermore, as Ross (2003) 
asserts, the Niger Delta has “three addition liabilities” which increase further the risk of an armed 
(secessionist) struggle: its unusually high level of unemployment and poverty and abysmally low 
level of social services compared to the national average
3, its swampy terrain which makes it 
difficult and expensive to develop, and what the author calls a “moral social disorder” arising 
from the activities of youth-based movements that frequently challenge not only the oil 
companies but also traditional authorities in their own communities, a development which makes 
peaceful settlement of disputes more difficult to achieve. There is an added “general liability” that  
the author did not note however : the fact that the Nigerian nation is currently passing through a 
                                                 
2 The Niger Delta region is a wetland of about 70000 sq km spread over a number of ecological zones 
along the Gulf of Guinea, and the third largest wetland in the world (Tell, Lagos, 6 September 2004).  
Officially, the Niger Delta is made up of nine states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, 
Imo, Ondo and Rivers) and has an estimated population of about 26.7million (Tell, 6 September 2004).  
Two of the states that officially constitute the Niger Delta (Abia and Imo) are situated in the southeastern 
part of Nigeria, one (Ondo) is located in the Southwest, while the remaining six constitute the South-South 
geopolitical zone (SSZ) and inhabits the so-called minority ethnic groups. Some authors have distinguished 
between the official Niger Delta and the geographical Niger Delta. The latter is thought of as consisting 
only of the six States in the South-South zone of the country.  
The Niger Delta alone accounts for over 90 percent of the nation’s oil revenue and its gas reserves are now 
touted as the next greatest potential revenue earner for the nation (Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation, 2005). Geological research shows that the Niger Delta (both onshore and offshore areas) is 
particularly conducive to the formation and accumulation of oil and gas (Hyne, 1995:90-98).  
 
3 Household survey conducted by the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS, 1996) Nigeria, puts poverty in the 
South-south region at 58.2 percent, the highest rate in the country. 
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reform process
4 which is creating winners and losers and thereby pushing upward the risk of 
violent conflict (Hegre and others, 2001; Hegre, 2003).  
 
There have been previous attempts at secession in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. In early 
1967, oil-related disputes motivated an insurrection by the Ijaws
5.  Less than a year after,  the 
country experienced a civil war (the Biafran war of 1967-70), a fall-out of disagreement  over the 
sharing of oil revenues and ethnic antagonism that have been created by a series of events which 
bordered on attempts by each of the major ethnic groups to control political power.  More 
recently, in the latter part of 2004, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), an 
organization of youths of Ijaw ethnic extraction (officially tagged a “rebel army” by the Nigerian 
government), engaged the Nigerian military forces in land and aerial battle. At the same time, the 
federal government declared it has identified 16 ethnic militias in the Niger Delta and discovered 
evidence linking some of the groups to external and internal collaborators.  More recently, there 
has been a renewed call for local control of oil wealth, an increase in military confrontations 
between armed groups and the Nigerian government, and attacks on oil installations and facilities 
in the region. The spate of kidnapping of foreign oil workers for ransom and as a means of 
asserting political demands has also increased. 
 
In general, the Niger Delta has been the site of much civil violence since 1999. According to a 
report by Hamilton and others (2003), violence in the Niger Delta is estimated to have killed 
about 1,000 persons a year between 1999 and 2004. 
 
There are many parts to oil and civil conflict in Nigeria
6. In this paper, I concentrate on just one: 
what determines the propensity to armed struggle among individuals in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
region?  The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I reviewed related literature on the 
factors that motivate individuals to initiate or participate in rebellion and when rebellion may 
indeed be expected to occur. A model is developed in section 3 which explains the decision to 
participate in rebellion as a function of individual and community-level characteristics. The basic 
predictions of the model are tested in section 4 while section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
4 This reform, which combines both economic and political aspects, began in 1999 and has recently gained 
momentum. 
 
5 The reference is to the “rebellion” led by Issac Boro and some youths from the Ijaw ethnic extraction in 
February 1967. 
6 In a related paper (“Oil-dependence and Civil conflict in Nigeria”: forthcoming), I explore the 
interrelatedness between these various parts).  
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2. GREED, GRIEVANCE AND OPPORTUNITY 
Resource-availability and extraction may contribute to civil conflict by providing rebels with an 
opportunity to loot and by creating grievances that exacerbate separatist tendencies (Ross, 2001). 
Theoretical explanations of the link between natural resources and civil conflict have typically 
followed these two approaches (Sambanis, 2004).  Relative deprivation theories of natural 
resources and civil wars explain rebellion by atypical severe grievances arising from high level of 
inequality, government repression and lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions 
(Borjas 1992, 1995; Easterly 2003; Goodhand, 2003; Cramer, 1999; Moore, 2000; Stewart and 
FitzGerald, 2000).  As the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingandael (2003) 
observes, poverty, resource scarcity and inequality hold high mobilizing qualities in rebellion and 
may be extremely potent when they combine with other factors such as discriminatory and 
exclusionary policies and failure of political institutions. 
 
Rationalist theories, however, focus on the opportunity to organize rebellion. The emphasis on 
rebel opportunity rather than grievance was popularized by Skocpol (1979). However, the author 
focused on political opportunities which make a revolution feasible. Rationalist theories of 
natural resources and civil war extend this consideration by focusing on the economic 
opportunities which resources availability presents for rebellion. These models are similar to 
Becker’s (1957) economic model of crime and draw heavily on Grossman (1991, 1995) and 
Hirschleifer (1995).   Rebellion is modeled as an outcome of kleptocratic rivalry or as an industry 
that generate profits from looting (Grossman 1999)
7, or as an uprising of the poor against the rich 
with a view to achieving a transfer of resources (Hirschleifer, 1991), or as a quasi-criminal 
activity (Collier, 2000).  In these models, conflicts are outcomes of rational decision making on 
the part of actors. Actors “choose” conflict when it is more profitable (Hirshleifer 1994).  In the 
words of Collier (2000) “rebellion is motivated by greed, so that it occurs when rebels can do 
well out of war”.   
 
                                                 
7 The author sees no difference between rebellion and crime. Collier (2000) however provides a distinction 
by consideration of factors such as income level and distribution, structure of the economy and group 
identity. He identifies a continuum in the scale of criminal violence from the violent robbery perpetuated by 
one individual against another, through gangs and mafias, up to large-scale conflicts with the state.  While 
violent crimes typically occur within rather than between communities, rebellion often adopts the discuss of 
grievance and the battle line of ethnic, religious and class division.  
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There is now a general consensus however about the limitation of the greed-grievance dichotomy 
in explaining the link between natural resources and civil war (Karen and Sherman, 2003; Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2002a; Collier and others, 2003:89)
8. The relationship between greed and grievance 
in rebellion is symbiotic.  Rebellion needs grievance to mobilize and overcome the severe 
constraints on entry
9. It also needs greed for it to be sustainable (overcome the financial viability 
constraint).  Thus greed may need to incite grievance for rebellion to get started.  Natural resource 
availability, particularly when the resource is lootable and/or obstructable
10 provides a unique 
opportunity for the existence and sustainability of a rebel organization irrespective of whether it is 
justice-seeking (grievance-motivated) or loot-seeking (greed-motivated) (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2002a; De Soysa, 2000).  
 
Collier and Hoefler (2002a) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) provide two recent applications of the 
rational choice theories, which explain rebellion as the outcome of rational decision-making 
subject to the constraint of the labor market. The risk of rebellion increases as per capita income, 
educational level of the citizens, economic growth declines. This is attributable to declining 
opportunity cost of violence (and the accompanying reduction in the supply of potential rebels, as 
in Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a) or to declining state capacity (as in Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  
According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), the supply of rebels increases if the state is “weak” 
(where state weakness is measured by income size) and cannot effectively police its territory.  In 
addition, mountainous terrain and a large population make policing more difficult
11. On the other 
                                                 
8 The authors argue that rebellion or civil war has not occurred in some current and historical cases of 
grievous injustice, such as occur in highly repressive societies (e.g. Iraq and Democratic Republic of 
Korea) or highly unequal societies (such as Chile and Kenya). Again, some states with large aid flows (e.g. 
Tanzania) which makes them attractive to capture does not face any greater risk of rebellion. 
 
9 Analogous to the existence of the free-rider problem for grievance-motivated rebellion and barriers to 
entry in imperfectly competitive industries, rebellion motivated by greed requires a certain minimum army 
size for survival (the entry threshold: Collier, 2000). 
 
10  The concept of lootability is defined in terms of the ease with which a resource can be appropriated by 
individuals and small groups of unskilled workers (Ross 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Le Billon, 2001). 
Obstructability defines the ease with which the processing or transportation of a resource can be 
interrupted.  According to Ross (2002), a resource is obstructable “when its transportation can be easily 
blocked by a small number of individuals with few weapons”.  It is relatively unobstructable “when it can 
be blocked with many soldiers and heavy equipment”.  Oil and natural gas are highly obstructable when 
they have to be transported long distance through above-group pipelines and trucks.   Resource location 
also affects its obstructability; offshore oil is, for example, relatively unobstructable (Ross 2002).  
 
11 Several earlier studies has emphasised state weakness as a cause of insurgency (for example, Fearon and 
Laitin, 1999; Hobsbawn 1973; Russel 1974) or the political dysfunctions of resource-dependent states 
(Ross, 1999; Karl 1997; Luciani 1990; Mahdavy 1970). Others have emphasised the geographical   8
hand, higher income and educational attainments reduce the risk of political violence by 
encouraging political participation and channeling conflicts through institutional pathways rather 
than violence (Collier and Hoefler, 2002a)
12.  
 
In the section that follows I present a theoretical model of a conflict entrepreneur’s
13 choice of 





3. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
14 
Assume that a rebel leader’s decision to conduct rebellion in a given region
15 is mainly motivated 
by the revenue that can be obtained from implicit or explicit taxation of the regional 
communities
16.    Let economic agents be endowed with a unit of labor l, stock of human capital h 
                                                                                                                                                 
characteristics of the regions where resources are located as contributory factors to the risk of civil war 
(Gates, 2002).   
 
12 Hegre (2002), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Hibbs (1973), Huntington (1968) also emphasize the role of 
education in reducing civil conflict and violence. 
 
13 The term is used to describe somebody that employs people and resources in conflict with a view to 
making maximum profit.  
 
14 The framework of the model is based on Deininger (2003). The author however focused on crime. I 
modify and extend the analysis to agent’s decision to join a rebel army through a consideration of net 
benefits and opportunities cost and incorporate non-monetary benefits.  Again, I acknowledge (but did not 
particularly model) the role of uncertainty and agent’s attitude to risk in determining the values of benefits 
from rebellion and productive work. 
 
15 A region would consist of more than one community and probably more than on state. However these 
communities and/states would normally share common ethnic identity or characteristics and also be 
geographically contiguous.  It can be assumed, as it always is the case, that the potential rebel leader would 
be interested in regional control (even though communities in the region may vary in their resource 
endowment), since it may not be possible to assert political and economic control over some communities 
in the region while others are left under the control of the State. The Niger Delta, especially the South-
South zone of Nigeria, can be viewed as an ethno-regional group consisting of various communities.  While 
some of these communities do not particularly have any oil endowment, the dispersion of oil resource 
across the region implies that unlimited access to the oil wealth can only be achieved by control over the 
entire region.  
 
16 The assumption of a greed-motivated rebellion is also not unreasonable in the case of the crisis in the 
Niger Delta region.  For example, the Congress of Niger Delta Youths (CNDY) and the Ijaw Youth 
Congress (IYC) publicly disowned Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the leader of the NDVPF (which has recently 
metamorphosise into the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta:MEND), describing the group 
as one of those organizations seeking monopoly of the oil theft business (The Punch, Nigeria, 19 July,   9
as well as physical capital or asset k.  Each agent can allocate her labor endowment either to 
productive activities (lp) or to rebellion (lr) so that 
lp + lr = 1            (1)                                                                    
Wages in the productive sector depend on h and k according to a function  
wp (h,k)                                 (2) 
with positive first derivatives. Communities or regions are assumed to be characterized by a 
public good endowment G1, and pre-existing level of grievance, G2.  For a community or region 
where there is widespread discontent arising from a feeling of marginalization or injustice 
perpetuated by the State, for example, G2 will tend to be high.   
The rebel leader selects communities or a region that provides a sufficient economic base such 
that he can finance rebellion by imposing a tax, t on the community or region (consider t as the 
rate of expropriation)
17. For effective expropriation and soldiering, he would need to recruit at 
least n1 (number of) persons from each community (as fighters, informants or agents). In addition, 
since government forces constitute an active threat to rebel survival, rebellion faces the 
organizational problem of surmounting an entry threshold.  The rebel force must exceed some 
critical level necessary for survival otherwise there will be rebel exit (Collier 2000).  
Collier (2000) argues that the relationship between rebel forces and government forces is 
proportional, such that n1 ≥ αn2, where n2 is the size of government forces and α is a factor of 
                                                                                                                                                 
2004). The two organizations claim to be the legitimate vehicles for the promotion of change with the 
object to seek, through dialogue, the economic and political development of the people of the Niger Delta.  
Reports from daily newspapers as well as foreign organizations appear to confirm this allegation.  They 
also reveal the existence (as at the time of investigation) of a rival group said to be as powerful as the state 
and enjoying the backing of prominent persons in government (Human Rights Watch, 2005; The Punch, 
Nigeria 30 September, 2004. p6).  
 
However, the assumption of a loot-seeking rebellion is not even necessary for the workability of the model, 
as it is now commonly agreed that even if a rebel leader is motivated by grievance and not by greed (i.e., 
rebellion is justice and not loot-seeking), financial resources are needed to prosecute rebellion and the 
availability of lootable and/or obstructible resources provides an incentive.   
 
17 We can view this taxation as a form of looting.  For a region rich in oil, for example, this could mean the 
direct and indirect costs of such activities as bunkering (stealing of crude oil), vandalization of oil 
installations, pipelines and other facilities; kidnapping for ransom and other forms of extortion on 
individuals and the community at large.  This could include increased insecurity, reduced economic 
opportunities, reduced socioeconomic activities as a result of increased military presence.  When rebellion 
is successful, taxation takes the form of control of the resource wealth in which case the tax rate, t, equals 
unity from the rebel leader’s perspective.    10
proportionality.  The rebel force must grow from 0 to αn2 before it can safely operate as a 
predator.  Financial viability at this minimum size is also a necessary condition for the existence 
of rebellion.   It follows that  
n1 = n (n2, G1, G2)       (3) 
with ∂ n1/∂ n2, ∂ n1/∂G1 > 0 and   ∂ n1/∂G2  < 0.  In other words, the number of persons a rebel 
leader would need to recruit within the community increases with the size of government forces 
available to crush rebellion and the public good endowment, and decreases with the pre-existing 
level of grievance.  A higher level of G1 (better infrastructure) increases n1 in two ways. First, it 
makes it more difficult for rebel forces to hide from government’s forces and also increases asset 
owner’s ability to take preventive measures to avoid taxation, as in private oil companies 
mobilizing against attacks on facilities and staff. Second, a higher G1 tends to reduce G2. 
Contrarily, higher G2 pre-disposes community members toward collaboration with rebels, 
therefore reducing the cost of initiating and sustaining violence.  
Following Gates (2002), I assume that the benefit to be derived by an economic agent from 
joining the rebel group would consist of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards.   
B1=B1 (M, N, D),                                                                         (4) 
where  B1  is net benefit from joining the army, M  is pecuniary benefits, N is non pecuniary 
benefits and D is the cost of joining the rebel army
18.  ∂B1 / ∂M, ∂ B1 / ∂N > 0; ∂ B1 / ∂D < 0. 
Pecuniary rewards may include wages, one-shot monetary rewards and other tangible rewards 
such as drugs or alcohol. Non-pecuniary benefits (N) includes functional and solidarity rewards 
(Brehm and Gates, 1994). Functional rewards consist of satisfaction derived from performing a 
designated ‘military’ task as given.  Solidarity rewards stems from the camaraderie among 
members of an armed group, a sort of bond developed among members as a result of continuous 
association in risky environments (Gates, 2002). Wood (2003), Weingstein (2005) also highlights 
the importance of honour, reputation and agency in providing impetus for collective action. 
Some benefits come in the short period. But a larger part may be conditioned on rebel success, in 
which case the value to the individual would depend on his estimation of the probability of 
success and his subjective discount rate (attitude to risk). A projected high probability of victory 
raises the value of the benefit while a strong risk aversion reduces its value to the individual.  
                                                 
18 In the limit, this may mean physical death.  
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The benefit derived from not joining the rebel force, i.e., engaging in productive labor, will be a 
function of the wage rate and the rate at which rebel army expropriate community’s wealth or 
reduce socio-economic opportunities
19.  Thus  
B2 = F(wp,t)                                                       (5) 
 where ∂F / ∂wp > 0 and ∂F / ∂t < 0.   
For any individual i  
wpi= wi (hi, ki,  g )                        (6) 
where g is the economy’s growth rate. We can think of ki as i’s stock of physical capital, e.g., 
agricultural land, machineries for production, etc or other forms of asset such as landed property.  
wpi will be lower for individuals with smaller h and k, but it will also be influenced by the average 
wage rate, which will depend on the level of productivity in the community and the growth rate of 
the economy (g). Also, in a society with a high unemployment level, wpi may not be available 
with certainty irrespective of the individual’s level of human capital (hi).   
For sufficiently high values of t and/or abysmally low values of wpi, B1i > B2i in which case, 
agents will prefer to allocate the whole of l to rebellion rather than to productive work.    In 
general, for any given t, B1i tends to exceed B2i at low levels of hi and ki, and the agent allocates li 
to rebellion. At higher levels of hi and ki. B1i tends to be lower than B2i and it is optimal to 
employ li in productive work rather than in rebellion (Fig 1).   It is also clear that for a given wp 
and g, there is a minimum level of h and k (denoted as h
e and k
e in Fig1) for which the individual 
is indifferent between engaging in productive labor and participating in rebellion.   
 
    
                                                 
19 If rebellion is successful, the rate of expropriation may become zero since there would be a new order of 
peace, and it may be impossible to exclude the individual from enjoying some of the general benefits.   12





hi, ki   
                                                                  h
e, k
e       
Fig. 1: Benefit and opportunity cost of joining a rebel group for given h and k 
 
Consider the optimizing behavior of the potential rebel leader. For rebellion to be sustainable, it 
must be financially viable at the minimum size of the rebel forces that constitute the entry 
threshold. In regional community j, with public good endowment, G1j, a level of pre-existing 
grievance G2j and natural resource endowment level Rj, the rebel leader’s profit is given as   
                    Пrj (R j, G1j, G2j, hij, kij) = tRj  - n (G1j, G2j) wri (hij, kij)          (7) 
where tRj is the total rent extracted from the community (region) and wpi is the pecuniary benefits 
that must be provided to make individual i indifferent between allocating li  between rebellion and 
production
20. Profit increases in the resource endowment of the community (region) as well as in 
the pre-existing level of grievance, falls in the pre-existing level of public goods and in recruits’ 
levels of human and physical capital (or asset).  Thus, the profit maximizing decision of the rebel 
leader will consist in choosing communities with higher resource endowment and recruiting 
individuals with endowments of h and k at the bottom of the distribution (i.e. persons with low 
levels of human and physical capital or asset) and/or share a common ethnic, religious, 
ideological or class background, such that the benefits from joining the rebel army outweighs the 
opportunity cost in terms of foregone income.  At the same time, agents with lower h and k are 
more likely to find it optimal to allocate labor to rebellion and violence rather than productive 
work.  Such agents are incentive compatible with the rebel leader and their availability in large 
number in a community reduces the cost of organizing rebellion.  It also enables the rebel leader 
                                                 
20 I assume that non-pecuniary benefits are provided costlessly by the rebel leader. In order to attract agents 
into rebellion, the rebel leader has to offer a reward (B1i) at least equal to B2i. 
 
B2i 
B1i   13
to overcome the collective action problem normally associated with grievance-motivated 
rebellion
21.  
The potential rebel leader (the government) could also seek to manipulate the cost-benefit 
structure faced by any given individual in a manner that makes participation (non participation) in 
rebellion the most highly-valued option (Brough and Elliot, 200?). This can be done through the 
use of incentives and disincentives for participation (Keen 2000; Brough and Elliot, 200?; 
Lichbash 1994; Popkin 1979).  For example, it may be possible for the rebel leader to use 
pecuniary enticements, particularly if the economy is underdeveloped and there are limited 
opportunities and benefits from market participation, or the mobilization of “social capital” 
(common collective identities or tight social networks) (Taylor, 1988; Weingstein, 2004), or 
exploitation of personal grievances (Moore, 2000). Similarly, the government can establish and 
maintain appropriate economic policies that stimulate and sustain growth or provide goods and 
services to the segment of the population that has the tendency to rebel.  Each of these will raise 
the opportunity cost of rebellion.  
 
When and where possible, the potential rebel leader could also inflict terror or “punishment” on 
those who are unwilling to participate in rebellion thereby creating a disincentive to non-
participation.  In the same way, the creation of effective military and police forces, a functioning 
intelligence gathering capability, stiff penalties against civil disobedience and the deployment of 
these in counter-insurgency are disincentives which the government may employ to raise the cost 
of participation
22.  Brough and Elliot (200?) argue that selective disincentives may be used more 
                                                 
21 Ordinarily, it is difficult to mobilize large scale participation required for a successful insurgency, since 
many of the collective benefits of a successful insurgency (e.g grievance alleviation or the provision of 
justice), assuming there are, will be realized independently of participation. The theories of collective 
action, for example, Oslon, 1965, consider large-scale collective action against the state a very remote 
possibility.  However, Brough and Elliot (200*) argue that the “free-riding” problem which limits 
collective organized violence only becomes serious when the cost of participation is substantial. 
 
22 It can be said that in the past few years the Nigerian government has provided both massive incentives 
and disincentives to raise the cost of rebellion in the Niger Delta. For example in 2001, the federal 
government launched the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) with the sole objective of 
developing and executing a master plan for the overall development of the Niger Delta. The NDDC is an 
attempt to break away from past practices and results, and is supported by the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP).  Again, in an attempt to diffuse tension and secessionist 
tendencies, the government introduced a system that transfer 13 percent of federally collected oil revenue 
to the oil-producing states. As a way of deterrence however, the government has maintained military 
presence in the communities and has often employed the tool of repression.  It also recently arrested the 
leaders of the NDVPF, its rival Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Movement for the Actualization of 
the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). 
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often if the relative cost of providing disincentives is lower than the price of providing 
incentives
23   
 
4. MODEL ESTIMATION 
The theoretical model predicts that the individual’s propensity to rebellion is a function of some 
individual-level characteristics, some community-level factors and the extent of personal 
grievance.  In this section I provide a test of these predictions. 
 
4.1 Sample Design and Data Collection Methods 
The empirical analysis focuses on three states in the Niger Delta region: Bayelsa, Delta, and 
Rivers.  Taken together, these states constitute the heart of the Delta and account for the bulk of 
Nigeria’s oil production.  The incidences of violent conflicts have also been especially 
concentrated in these states in the last six to eight years. These features combinedly make them 
the states of choice. To generate the sample, I selected four local government areas (LGAs) in 
each state
24 and seven or eight communities from each of the four LGAs.  In all 23 communities 
were selected for the study.  
 
The first phase of the field study involved carrying out a preliminary investigation of the selected 
communities, conducting focused group discussions (FGDs) and personal interviews with 
individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the area of conflict 
prevention and resolution or community development in the selected states. The second phase 
involved administering 1,500 structured questionnaires on selected individuals in the three states 
using systematic sampling technique
25.  A total of 18 (six from each state) communities drawn 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ethnic militias have also employed massive incentives for participation. “Oil bunkering” (stealing of oil), 
kidnapping for ransom has been a “booming business” in the Niger Delta for some time.  According to a 
report (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005), organised groups earn up to US $1 billion per year from large-scale 
“bunkering” in Nigeria, a situation the Nigerian government has only recently begun to address. A lot of 
propaganda has also been employed by militias to boost public perceptions of their military capabilities.  
 
23 The analysis ignores third-party involvement which can shift the cost of participation.   For example, 
Collier and others (2003) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) suggest that support from “external patrons” 
reduces the cost to rebel groups of organizing violence, which makes civil conflict more likely. 
 
24 An exception is Bayelsa state where the sample cuts across five local government areas. The list of 
communities is appended. 
25 First, we selected some catchments (areas), where we knew that youths could easily be found (e.g., 
community halls, motor parks).  Second, we determined the number of streets (or major streets) in the 
community and allocated a fixed number of questionnaires to each street.  We then determined the   15
from the 23 covered in the first phase were chosen for the second phase of the survey
26.  The 
questionnaires were administered only on males, with a bias towards those who by casual 
observation are above 15 years old.  The focus on males was deliberate.  While females (women) 
have been involved in oil protests in the Niger Delta in recent times, young males remain the best 
recruits for armed struggle (Collier, 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000).  At the end of the 
exercise, a total of 163 ill-conditioned questionnaires were rejected which left us with a 
functional sample size of 1337.  
 
4.2 Sample Characteristics 
The sample of individuals and communities used in the study gives useful insights. Descriptive 
analyses (Table 3) show significant variation in the communities in terms of quantity of oil 
endowment, distance from state capital, social infrastructure and conflict history (this is reflected 
in the very high standard deviations for these variables). While 38.87 percent of the communities 
sampled had no oil, those that had oil varied significantly in terms of quantity of endowment.  
There is also significant variation in income and socio-economic access (personal inclusion) 
among individuals in the sample.  In addition, while 67.14 percent of the people sampled have at 
least one form of asset, there is significant variation in the assets held.  
 
Only 27.67 percent of the population sampled are unemployed, but income level is generally low. 
With a mean income class of 0.99, 69.36 percent of the sampled population earns below N7, 000 
(about US $51.47) and 90.08 percent below N15, 000 (about US $110) a month.   Formal 
educational attainment is also low with only 9.27 percent having completed tertiary education and 
51.49 percent never going beyond primary educational level. A generally high level of personal 
grievance against the Nigerian State is also noticeable. 80.84 percent of sampled population 
                                                                                                                                                 
residential houses/business premises to be visited using a simple formula  j = N/n, where N is the number 
of residential houses/business premises in the street and n is the number of questionnaires to be 
administered in the street. For example, if j =5, we begin with the first premise (building), and thereafter, 
visit each successive fifth premise.  In each of the places visited, a male of not less than 15 years old (by 
observation) was interviewed.  Only, one individual is selected from each premise.  In order to avoid any 
bias arising from group influence, selected individuals in the catchments areas were interviewed separately.   
For example, each field assistant picks one prospective respondent and interview the individual in some 
distance apart. 
 
26 As a first step, the questionnaire was pre-tested on 25 respondents randomly selected from two 
communities in Delta state with a view to gauging its effectiveness, after which some slight changes were 
made. For example, questions 11 and 13 in the Questionnaire were introduced after the pre-testing. The 18 
communities were selected in a way as to make the sample as representative as possible, based on 
observations in the first phase of the survey. In addition, two communities were dropped as a result of 
extreme difficulties and risk encountered in the first phase. 
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expressed a high grievance level while 13.81 percent do not feel as strongly aggrieved. Only a 
low of 5.12 percent feel personally satisfied or undisturbed with the status quo. Paradoxically, 
there is a general positive expectation about the future (hope), with only 4.68 percent of the 
sampled population expressing despair or uncertainty.  77.74 percent of communities surveyed 
have experienced at least one violent conflict
27 over the past 10 years from the date of survey.  
 
4.3 Data 
The Dependent Variable (rebel_participation) is a dummy indicating that the respondent is  






Ethnic is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the respondent is an Ijaw and 0 otherwise. About 
14 million Ijaws constitute the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta and the fourth largest ethnic 
group in Nigeria (Catholic World News, 2004). 
Unemployment is a dummy measuring the state of unemployment.  It takes the value of 1 if the 
individual is currently unemployed and is not a full-time student or apprentice, and 0 otherwise.   
Studentship is a dummy indicating that respondent is currently a full-time student in a formal 
educational institution or apprentice in a vocational training. 
Education  is a discrete variable that measures the level of respondent’s formal educational 
attainment.  The variable takes on a value of 3 if respondent completed tertiary education, 2 if 
respondent completed secondary education, 1 if respondent completed primary education, and 0 if 
respondent has no formal education. 
Marriage is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if respondent is married and 0 otherwise
29. 
                                                 
27 I define a violent conflict as one involving destruction of life and/or property. 
 
28 The data is derived from answers to the question “Will you be willing to join a group that will be able to 
fight to ensure that your community and other communities in the Niger Delta own and manage the oil in 
their lands?”  It takes a value of 1 if respondent’s answer is “yes” and 0 otherwise. 
 
29 It is possible to make further distinctions, e.g., if divorced or separated, if married with children etc. But I 
assume that the distinction between married and unmarried is adequate for the purpose of this study.     17
Asset is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if respondent has a physical asset and 0 otherwise. 
Three types of assets are considered: landed properties and farmlands, motor vehicles and motor 
bikes, and machineries that could be used to generate income.  
Assetimmobility is a dummy that indicate that the asset possessed is highly immobile. Only one 
class of asset is classified as highly immobile: landed properties and farmlands.  
Farmland is a dummy whose value is 1 if asset possessed is a farmland and 0 otherwise. 
Farmoil is a dummy whose value is 1 if asset possessed is a farmland and respondent’s 
community is endowed with oil.   
Income is respondent’s average monthly income if employed. The variable takes discrete values 
ranging from 1 to 7 based on respondent’s income bracket. The purpose of measuring income 
level by income groups rather than the absolute value of income is to avoid having a very large 
standard deviation for the variable relative to others (Long, 1997:54). 
Inclusion is a measure of respondent’s personal and economic access. It is a discrete variable 
derived by summing values on some measures of socio-economic access, which includes access 
to three basic amenities: pipe borne water, modern toilet facility, and electricity. Others are access 
to education (if respondent is of school-going age) or access to employment (by type), and access 
of children or siblings to secondary or primary education. The variable takes on values from 0 to 
11. 
Hope is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if respondent expresses hope in the future and 0 
otherwise.  
Grievance is a discrete variable measuring the extent to which the respondent feels personally 
aggrieved against the Nigerian State or its institution.  The variable takes on a value of 0 if 
respondent exhibit no personal grievance, 1 if respondent shows a moderate grievance, and 2 if 
respondent exhibits a high grievance
30.  
                                                 
30 The data is derived from answers to the question “As a citizen of Nigeria, do you feel cheated or marginalized?”  
Responses are coded 2 for “Yes (highly)”, 1 for “Yes (fairly)”, and, 0 for “Unsure”  
and “No”. 
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Community-level characteristics 
Oil is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the community in which respondent is resident  
has a proven oil endowment and 0 otherwise. 
 
Oilsize measures the size of oil endowment in respondent’s community of residence. The value 
 is determined by the number of oil wells in the community and ranges from 0 to 31. 
Infrastructure is a discrete variable that measures the extent to which the community the 
individual is resident is endowed with physical (social) infrastructure.  The value is derived by 
summing up available tarred (paved) roads (measured in kilometers and scaled down by the 
minimum kilometer of tarred road in the communities covered), the number of functional public 
schools and hospitals, and other public projects such as town halls or recreational sites available 
in the community; and ranges from 2 to 22.  
Government is a discrete variable denoting government’s presence in the community.  This is 
measured by the number of state or federal government establishments in the community. Its 
value ranges from 0 to 2. 
Distance is a variable measuring the distance between the individual’s community of residence 
and the state capital.  The value is based on the cost of transportation from the former to the latter. 
Actual costs are scaled down by the minimum transportation cost in the sample. The resultant 
data ranges from 1 to 43.33. 
Conflict is a variable measuring the extent to which the individual’s community of residence has 
been exposed to violent conflicts.  The value is determined by the number of violent conflicts the 
community has experienced in the last ten years from the date of the survey (March, 2005).  I 
define a violent conflict as one involving a loss of life and/or properties. 
Delta is a geographic dummy indicating that respondent’s community is geographically located in 
Delta state.   
Rivers is a geographic dummy indicating that respondent’s community is geographically located 
in Rivers state and 0 otherwise. 
While the data gathered from the survey are to the best of my knowledge reliable, there are 
obvious limitations in the use of the data to generate values for some variables. For example, the 
decision on what should be the basis for measuring inclusion and the weights attached to each of   19
the factors used is arbitrary.  Again, the data on infrastructure basically ignores the quality of 
existing social infrastructures.  Also, the asset dummy ignores the number or quantity of assets an 
individual may posses (e.g., an individual with one residential building is treated the same as one 
with two or more residential buildings) and also the variation in the quality of each type of asset, 
while data on oilsize assumes that a larger number of oil wells translates to a larger endowment of 
oil.  In addition, the figures on the number of oil wells and data on conflict are taken as given by 
community leaders with verification only where possible.  However, these limitations are 
considered acceptable given the absence (or inaccessibility) of official data on these variables. In 
addition, the data is considered fairly adequate for the purpose of this study, since the main 
interest is not in the exact figures but in the relative measurements.  
 
Data Grouping 
Following the theoretical literature, I attempt to group the variables into two: those that reflect the 
motivation for rebellion, and others that reflect opportunity (Table 4).   
 
I consider control over oil rents to be the major potential benefit from rebellion. It is also 
plausible to assume that the larger the size of the endowment, the greater is the potential benefit.  
Again, it may be assumed that individuals from the majority ethnic group in the Niger Delta (the 
Ijaws) stand to benefit the most from an independent Niger Delta.  These expected benefits can be 
a major motivation for participation in rebellion.  
 
In the same manner, unemployment; personal economic and social exclusion; absence of social 
infrastructure at the community level; environmental cost imposed by oil extraction and 
production activities; physical, monetary and psychological costs imposed as a result of past 
experiences of violent conflict and other traumatic experiences encountered by an individual or 
community in which he belongs; may generate personal grievance, which in turn feeds into a 
disposition to armed rebellion
31. Similarly, the absence of any government presence (in terms of a 
government establishment) in a community may create a feeling of corporate exclusion which 
generate grievance. Also, it may be expected that the Ijaws who constitute the largest ethnic 
group in the Niger Delta (and hence account for the largest share of Nigeria’s oil production) are 
likely to feel more personally aggrieved in relation to the sharing of the nation’s oil wealth.  
 
                                                 
31 Conflict history of community may affect the disposition to armed rebellion through channels other than 
grievance; for example, by building up conflict capital, or by creating a disincentive for further conflicts.   20
The presence of onshore oil in many parts of the Niger Delta raises the financial viability of 
rebellion.  A lack of government presence; longer distance from state capital; and lack of 
infrastructure, especially access roads; also reduces the risk of participation.  However, higher 
educational attainment, higher income level from present employment, asset possession and/or 
asset-immobility, marital commitment, enrolment in a formal educational institution or on-going 
vocational training (apprenticeship), increases the individual’s opportunity cost of participation.  
Also, while larger oil endowment offers larger potential benefits from rebellion, it raises the prize 
to be won by both sides in a conflict, and thus tends to increase the intensity of conflict.  In 
particular, larger oil endowment may increase the risk of participation through the “pre-emptive 
repression effect”, whereby the government acts strategically to protect its control of a resource 
by using terror against the population (Ross, 2004a). 
 
 4.4 Estimation Procedure and Results 
  
Estimating the Propensity to Armed Struggle  
Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables and the associated z 
statistic for the Logit model on the propensity to armed rebellion and the predicted probability of 
participation. The diagnostic tests show that the model fits fairly well and we can reject the 
hypothesis that none of the regressors determine the propensity toward armed conflict.  About 
36.18 percent of the sampled population revealed a propensity to take up arms against the state. 
This implies the existence of a potential rebel army size of 1, 262, 271 (or 24.19 percent of the 
overall male population) in the three states that constitute the heart of the Niger Delta
32.  
 
An examination of the results reveals five individual-level and four community-level 
characteristics that determine the propensity to armed conflict in the Niger Delta. At the 
individual level, the combination of a low income, low formal educational attainment, lack of 
marital bond, and lack of asset (or possession of highly mobile asset), reduces the propensity to 
armed conflict. (This agrees with predictions of the theoretical model developed in section 3). 
                                                 
32 The figure is derived as follows.  I estimated the population for the three states based on figures for 1998 
provided by the  Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), Nigeria, using the formula, Pt = Poe
rt, with r = 0.0283. 
With information provided on the sex and age distributions of the population, I was able to estimate the 
male population size for each age group in my sample.  Next, I found the percentage of the population in 
each age group in the sample that indicated a propensity to armed struggle and multiplied this by the 
projected population for the group. The final figure was derived by summing the figures for the various 
groups in the three states. 
 
Since Bayelsa State came into existence after 1998, and was carved out of the other two, figures provided 
for Delta and Rivers States were used to estimate the population of the three states.     21
The propensity is however increased if the individual is from the majority ethnic group in the 
region and expects his tribe to benefit the most from a successful rebellion. 
   
At the community level, the availability of oil in a community that is administratively peripheral 
(i.e., the community is far away from the state capital and registers no government presence) 
makes the community a haven for would-be rebels.  The size of the oil endowment however has a 
negative effect on the propensity to armed conflict.  While the discovery of oil in a community is 
likely to trigger violence, the probability of participating in armed conflict reduces as the quantity 
of oil resource available in the community increases. From these considerations, it appears that 
the communities with the highest conflict risk are those with marginal oil endowments and are 
also administratively peripheral.  Intuitively, these communities are also the most disadvantaged.  
They suffer from the negative effects of oil exploration and rent seeking contest among 
participants at the local level, which communities without oil may not experience.  But they do 
not have enough oil to secure government’s or oil companies’ attention as do those with large oil 
endowments.  
 
Why does the size of oil endowment exhibit a beneficial effect on the propensity to violent 
conflict?
33  At the micro level, larger oil endowments may make the residents of a community to 
be less willing to engage in civil disobedience in order not to attract the wrath of the state and the 
ensuing disorder and pillaging that may result (i.e., it may create an incentive for locals to protect 
their endowment even if ownership is merely psychological).  It may also be that communities 
with larger oil endowments have already been securitized (the state considers such communities 
of vital importance and maintains a larger network of security personnel in the area: Klare, 2002, 
Ross 2004a) so that rebellion is potentially prohibitive. It is also plausible that communities with 
larger oil endowments also enjoy larger endowments of social infrastructures and amenities since 
allocation of resources by the various intervention agencies to oil producing communities in the 
Niger Delta has been based on the share of oil revenue contributed by each community, and oil 
companies’ “development programs” are often directed toward the communities they benefit 
                                                 
33 Collier and Hoeffler (2002b) posit the existence of a nonlinear relationship between oil-availability and 
civil conflict. The larger the oil endowment, the greater the capacity of governments to maintain an 
extensive security network, and hence the greater the ability to overcome any civil uprising.  Other studies 
have explored the beneficial effects of very large oil wealth, but these studies approach the discussion from 
the macro level.    
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from the most in terms of oil exploration
34. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that the larger a 
community’s oil endowment, the greater the incentive for oil companies to buy peace.   
 
Given the non-significance of grievance in the estimated results, I proceeded to check whether 
the data provide a systematic and rational explanation of personal grievance among the 
population. To this end, I estimated an Ordered Regression Model on grievance (McElvey and 
Zaviona, 1975). The results (Table 6) show that we can safely reject the hypothesis that none of 
the regressors determine grievance. The estimated thresholds (cutpoints) which separates between 
no grievance and low grievance and between low and high grievance levels are also highly 
significant, thus justifying the use of the ordered regression model and the choice of the three 
outcomes.    
 
From the results, six variables systematically explain grievance: infrastructure, ethnic, education, 
inclusion, farmland, and income. Personal grievance level falls as income level, personal socio-
economic access, increases and also with increases in social infrastructure at the community 
level. However, surprisingly, grievance increases in the level of educational attainment.  This 
result suggests that higher educational attainment brings increased awareness which tends to 
generate grievance when the factors that are capable of producing grievance are present. The 
possession of a farmland (as opposed to other types of assets) also increases grievance level but it 
is difficult to link this with the negative effects of oil exploration and production activities since 
farmoil is highly insignificant in the model. The positive effect and high significance of ethnic in 
explaining grievance tends to lend empirical support to the submission in the literature of the 
existence of close, sometimes inseparable, connection between grievance and greed in motivating 
rebellion.  The comparison of these results with the descriptive and complementary analysis of 
the factors at the root of personal grievance in the sampled population (Table 7) reveals some 
similarity.  
  
Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn from the two set of regression results (Tables 5 and 6) is 
that while a high level of grievance exists in the sampled population and this can be 
systematically explained, grievance in itself does not appear to create a disposition to armed 
conflict.   In addition, the variables that are more commonly associated with grievance in the 
region, such as personal socioeconomic exclusion; corporate exclusion, as revealed in lack of 
                                                 
34 The pair-wise correlation analysis shows a positive but moderate correlation between quantity of oil and 
endowment of social infrastructure. 
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social infrastructure at the community level; and the negative effect of oil exploration and 
production activities; while important in themselves, do not appear to have mobilizing power for 
rebellion.  In contrast, all the factors that are used to proxy opportunity in the model (except 
studentship) are statistically significant thus suggesting that factors that reduce the opportunity 
cost and risk of participation or increased the perceived benefits are more important.  Even 
though lower income level tends to increase grievance level, its effect on the propensity to armed 
struggle appears to be via opportunity rather than grievance.  Also, state-level differences appear 
to matter.     
 
Some further Analyses and Robustness Checks 
I investigated the effect of variations in some of the statistically significant variables on the 
predicted probability of participating in armed conflict (Long, 1997). I find that even though the 
beneficial effect of larger oil endowment is monotonic, it is not strong enough to totally overcome 
the corrupting influence of oil availability (Fig. 2 illustrates).  For example, an increase in the 
number of oil wells from 1 to 31 (the highest in the sample) reduces the probability of 
participation by only 23 percent from 0.4143 to 0.3189. Thus, oil endowment will have to grow to 
an infinitely large size to completely neutralize the negative effect of oil availability on the 
probability of participation.  The beneficial effect of increases in income on the predicted 
probability of participation also decreases as we move from the lowest to the highest income 
group in the sample (Fig. 3). The same form of nonlinearity can be observed in the case of 
increases in educational attainment (Fig 4). However, the effect of increases in government 
presence is almost linear (Fig 5). 
 
To further explore the effect of these factors on the propensity to armed conflict and the 
probability of participation, I generated two samples which are subsets of the overall sample.  The 
first, which I call the “high-risk” sample, consists only of respondents with low income, low 
educational attainment and no marital bond
35. The second, called the “geographically risky” 
                                                 
35 Low income is defined as INC≤ 2 (i.e. income of less than N15, 000: about US$110 a month). Low 
educational attainment is defined as EDU≤ 1(Primary education or less).  I do not include “no asset” as one 
of the characteristics of this sample because doing so reduces the size of the sample beyond manageable 
level. Also students and apprentices are not included. 
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sample, consists of respondents in communities whose characteristics favor rebellion
36.  I then 
estimated version of the logit regression on rebel_participation for each sample.  
 
The regression results for the “high-risk” sample are presented in Table 8.  The variables that 
determine the propensity to armed struggle (and the probability of participation) in this sample 
are oil-availability in the community, government presence and the size of oil endowment.  As in 
the overall sample, government presence and larger oil endowment constrain the propensity to 
rebellion while oil availability spurs rebellion. At the personal level, ethnic identity and grievance 
do not matter for this group of individuals while distance loses its significance at the community 
level.  
 
I examined the effect of variations in oil-availability and government presence on the propensity 
to armed struggle among individuals in this group and find that the discovery of oil in a 
community that has been without oil (holding other variables constant) increases the propensity 
by 13.52 standard deviations. This compares unfavorably with the 6.22 standard deviations 
increase in the general sample. Similarly, a standard deviation increase in government presence 
reduces the propensity to armed struggle by 3.82 standard deviations (compared to 0.87 in the 
overall population).   
 
This contrast is even more striking in terms of odds ratios. While oil discovery (other variables 
remaining constant) raises the odds of participating in an armed struggle by a factor of 5.38 (438 
percent) in the overall sample, the odds are 38.36 larger in the “high risk” sample!  Thus the 
effect of oil discovery on the odds of participation is more than seven times larger in the latter 
than in the former.  In the same vein, the effect of a “one unit increase in government presence” 
(other variables held constant) on the odds of participation is about two and a half times as large 
in the “high risk” sample compared to the overall sample. While a one unit increase in 
government presence reduces the odds of participation by a factor of 0.73 (or 27 percent) in the 
overall sample, the odds are reduced by a factor of 0.33 (67 percent) in the latter.  
 
Only four individual-level variables statistically determine the propensity to armed rebellion in 
the “geographically-risky” sample: ethnic, income, education and hope (Table 9).   The first 
three variables have the expected signs but hope is positively related to the propensity to armed 
                                                 
36 This sample consists of communities with oil, distant from state capital and without government 
presence.  A community is adjudged to be distant from state capital when the value of distance is higher 
than the overall average (8.23). 
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struggle. It appears that a positive expectation about the future feeds into the propensity to armed 
rebellion in communities where the geographic characteristics increase the probability of 
success.  While the effect of a variation in income level on the propensity to armed struggle is not 
significantly different in the “geographically-risky” sample compared to the overall sample (even 
though it is slightly higher in the former), there is a remarkable difference in the effect of 
variations in educational attainment. While a standard deviation increase in educational 
attainment (other variables remaining the same) reduces the propensity to armed rebellion by 2.06 
standard deviations in the “geographically risky” sample, the effect on the propensity to armed 
rebellion in the overall sample is -0.92 standard deviations.  In terms of odds, a one unit increase 
in educational attainment reduces the odds of participation in armed struggle by 53 percent in the 
“geographically-risky” sample compared to 28 percent in the overall sample.   
 
Finally the mean predicted probability of participation is higher in the “high-risk” and 
“geographically-risky” samples compared to the overall sample, and highest in the 
“geographically-risky” sample at 0.78 (Table 10).  
 
5.  CONCLUSION  
This  paper attempts to explain the determinants of the propensity to armed struggle and the 
probability of participation by individuals in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria using primary 
(micro) data. About 36 percent of the sampled population revealed a likelihood of participating in 
an armed struggle, implying the existence of a potential rebel army size of about 24 percent of the 
overall male population in the three states that constitute the heart of the Delta. This is a 
formidable size and indicates that the risk of an armed struggle in the region is not illusory.  
 
While grievance appears to be pervasive among individuals and communities and is 
systematically explained by the data, neither grievance level nor its commonly-cited causal 
factors, appear to be strong enough to create a disposition toward armed rebellion.  Rather, factors 
that reduce the opportunity cost and risk of participation or increase the perceived benefits appear 
to be more important.  Three of these factors (income level, educational attainment, and 
government presence) are amenable to policy makers’ control.  
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Table 1: Mineral Resources and Secessionist Movements 
Country Region  Duration  Resources 
Angola Cabinda  1975-2002  Oil,  Diamonds 
Burma Hill  tribes  1949-  Tin,  gems 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Kantaga/Shaba  1960-65  Copper 
Indonesia  West Papau  1969-   Copper, gold 
Indonesia Aceh 1975-2005  Natural  gas 
Morocco  West Sahara  1975-88  Phosphates, Oil 
Nigeria Biafra  196-70  Oil 
Papau New Guinea  Bougainville  1988-  Copper, gold 
Sudan South  1983-  Oil 
Source: Ross, 2003b 
 
 
Table 2: Niger Delta Fields: Operator, Fields and Reserves (million barrels) 
OPERATOR                FIELDS             RESERVES 
Shell Bonga    600   
 Bonga  south  West    600   
 Bomu    875   
 Cawthorne  Channel    750   
 Forcados-Yokri    1,235   
 Imo  River    875   
 Jonnes  Creek    900   
 Nembe  Creek  8  950  6,785 
Mobil Edop    733   
 Erha    1,200   
 Ubit  3  945  2,878 
Chevron Texaco  Agbami    1,000   
 Delta    300   
 Meren    1,100   
 Apoi-North-Funiwa    500   
 Okan  5  800  3700 
Agip Ebegoro  1  160  160 
TotalFinaElf Amenam-Kpono    500   
 Akpo    200   
 Obagi  3  670  1370 
Total   20    14893 
Source:  NNPC (2005) 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable                         Mean        Std. Dev.  
 Rebel_participation           0.362         0.481        
   education                         1.516         0.747       
      income                          0.994         1.408        
       asset                             0.671         0.470        
assetimmobility                   0.577         0.494        
 studentship                         0.347         0.482        
    marriage                         0.627         0.484       
         Oil                               0.611         0.488       
     oilsize                             9.611         10.305      
      ethnic                            0.392          0.488       
  government                       0.389          0.756       
    distance                           8.233          9.211      
   inclusion                          3.689          1.939       
unemployment                     0.281          0.469      
        hope                            0.955          0.207       
   grievance                         2.705          0.720       
infrastructure                      8.305          5.049       
    farmland                          2.318          2.494      
     farmoil                            0.262          0.440      
    conflict                            1.610          1.458       
 
 
Table 4: Classification of Variables 
 
        Classification                        Variables 
1.  Motivation 
          Greed       
               Grievance      
 
oil (+), oilsize (+), ethnic (+) 
        
unemployment (+), farmoil (+), inclusion (-),  
hope (-), grievance (+), infrastructure (-), conflict (+),   
ethnic (+) 
       
      2.  Opportunity 
       
 
oil (+), distance (+),  government (-) ,infrastructure (-),  
oilsize (-),  education (-), income (-) , studentship(-),  
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Table 5: Logit regression on rebel_participation 
 
                             (1)           (2)          (3)          (4)        (5)         (6)        (7)         (8)         (9) 
Motivation 
ethnic                     1.12         1.12        1.12        1.12     1.13      1.12        1.15     1.17       1.15 
                          (0.19)     (0.19)      (0.19)     (0.19)    (0.19)   (0.19)     (0.19)   (0.19)    (0.19) 
oilsize                               -0.10      -0.09        -0.10      -0.10     -0.09     -0.09       -0.09    -0.10      -0.09 
                                          (0.02)     (0.02)      (0.02)     (0.02)    (0.02)   (0.02)      (0.02)   (0.02)    (0.02) 
oil                                       1.75        1.64         1.67        1.67      1.68     1.64        1.63     1.67       1.68 
                                          (0.31)     (0.31)      (0.31)     (0.31)    (0.31)   (0.31)     (0.31)   (0.31)     (0.31) 
inclusion                        0.07         0.07        0.07       0.07      0.07      0.09        0.08     0.08    
                          (0.07)      (0.07)     (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)     (0.05)  (0.05)  
infrastructure                     -0.18        -0.02      -0.02      -0.02    -0.02     -0.02       -0.02           
                                           (0.19)      (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)      (0.02)          
grievance                            0.99         0.12        0.12        0.12     0.12     0.12                      
                                           (0.95)      (0.10)     (0.10)     (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.10)                  
conflict                               0.48         0.05        0.05        0.05                                    
                                          (0.67)       (0.07)     (0.07)     (0.07)                               
unemployment                  -0.06       -0.08       -0.05                                           
                                           (0.22)      (0.22)     (0.22)                                          
hope                                    0.02         0.08                                                    
                                           (0.45)      (0.45)                                                  
Opportunity 
income                               -0.45      -0.47        -0.45      -0.44      -0.44    -0.46     -0.47     -0.48     -0.45 
                          (0.09)    (0.09)       (0.09)    (0.07)     (0.07)   (0.07)    (0.07)    (0.07)   (0.07) 
asset                                   -0.68  
                                          (0.16) 
assetimmobility                               -0.81        -0.81      -0.82       -0.82    -0.81     -0.80     -0.78     -0.79 
                                                        (0.16)       (0.16)     (0.16)     (0.16)   (0.16)    (0.16)   (0.16)    (0.16) 
marriage                            -0.54      -0.52        -0.52      -0.51       -0.51    -0.53     -0.52     -0.53     -0.50 
                         (0.15)     (0.15)       (0.15)     (0.15)     (0.15)    (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.15)    (0.15) 
education                           -0.40      -0.42        -0.43      -0.43      -0.43    -0.45     -0.43      -0.42    -0.33 
                          (0.14)    (0.14)       (0.13)    (0.13)     (0.13)   (0.13)    (0.13)    (0.12)   (0.11) 
government                       -0.35      -0.33        -0.34      -0.34       -0.34     -0.33    -0.32     -0.33     -0.31 
                                          (0.11)     (0.11)      (0.11)     (0.11)      (0.11)    (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.11)    (0.11) 
distance                              0.03       0.04         0.04        0.04         0.04      0.04       0.04     0.04      0.04 
                                          (0.01)    (0.01)       (0.01)     (0.01)      (0.01)    (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)    (0.01) 
studentship                         0.15       0.10          0.12       0.16        0.17                            
                                          (0.24)     (0.23)      (0.23)     (0.17)      (0.17)                          
State-level differences  
delta                                   2.06       1.84         1.83        1.83         1.77       1.78      1.77      1.87     1.96 
                                          (0.30)    (0.29)      (0.29)      (0.27)       (0.27)    (0.27)   (0.26)   (0.26)   (0.26) 
rivers                                 1.03       0.99         0.99        1.00          0.99       1.01      1.00      1.02     1.01 
                                          (0.23)    (0.23)     (0.23)      (0.23)       (0.23)     (0.23)   (0.23)   (0.23)   (0.23) 
Observations                     1337     1337        1340       1340         1340       1340     1341     1341    1341 
 Pseudo R
2                          0.26     0.26         0.26        0.26           0.26       0.26      0.26     0.26       0.26   
Log likelihood               -649.9    -646.3    -647.4     -647.5       -647.5    -647.5   -647.9   -647.5    -649.9 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. asset is replaced with assetimmobility in Models 2 through 9.  (3) 
through (9) progressively omits the least significant variable in previous model.  The final model (9) 
contains only variables that are significant at the conventional 5% level. All regressions include an 
intercept. 
 














Fig. 2: The effects of oil availability and the size of endowment on the Probability of Participation 
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      Fig. 3: Income level and Probability of Participation 
 
                                Fig.4: Educational attainment and Probability of Participation 
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    Table 6: Ordered Logit regression on grievance 
 
                                        (1)            (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)          (6)         (7)         (8) 
         
infrastructure                 -0.11        -0.11      -0.10       -0.10      -0.10      -0.10     -0.09     -0.09 
                                       (0.02)      (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)   (0.01) 
ethnic                              0.94         0.94        0.91        0.92       0.94        0.93     0.96       0.96 
                                       (0.18)      (0.18)     (0.17)     (0.17)     (0.17)    (0.17)   (0.17)    (0.17) 
education                        0.60         0.60        0.61        0.61        0.56      0.57     0.57        0.57 
                                       (0.14)      (0.14)     (0.14)     (0.14)     (0.14)    (0.14)   (0.13)    (0.14) 
inclusion                        -0.23        -0.23       -0.23      -0.23      -0.19      -0.20    -0.20     -0.19 
                                      (0.06)       (0.06)     (0.06)     (0.06)     (0.05)    (0.05)   (0.05)    (0.05) 
farmland                         0.07         0.07        0.08        0.10        0.10       0.10     0.10       0.10 
                                      (0.06)       (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.03)     (0.03)    (0.03)   (0.03)    (0.03) 
Income                          -0.12         -0.12      -0.13       -0.12      -0.13      -0.15    -0.15     -0.14 
                                      (0.06)       (0.06)     (0.06)     (0.06)     (0.06)    (0.05)   (0.05)     (0.05) 
government                    0.22          0.22        0.19       0.19        0.20       0.19     0.16     
                                      (0.11)       (0.11)     (0.11)     (0.11)     (0.10)    (0.10)   (0.10)   
oilsize                            0.01           0.01       0.01        0.01        0.01       0.01             
                                      (0.01)       (0.01)     (0.00)     (0.00)      (0.00)   (0.00)           
unemployment               0.27          0.27        0.26       0.26         0.24                     
                                      (0.19)       (0.19)     (0.19)     (0.19)      (0.19)                   
hope                               0.64          0.64        0.66        0.59                             
                                      (0.47)       (0.47)     (0.47)     (0.46)                           
asset                               0.16          0.16        0.15                                     
                                      (0.21)       (0.21)     (0.21)                                   
oil                                  -0.23         -0.23                                            
                                      (0.31)       (0.29)                                           
farmoil                           0.02                                                     
                                       (0.32)                                                   
    τ1                               -2.59       -2.59       -2.55        -2.62       -3.12     -3.26    -3.23     -3.28      
                                       (0.51)     (0.50)     (0.50)      (0.49)      (0.29)    (0.28)  (0.27)    (0.27)  
    τ2                                                 -1.06       -1.05       -1.01        -1.10       -1.59     -1.72   -1.70      -1.75      
                                       0.50         0.50        0.50         0.48        0.27       0.25    0.25       0.25    
Observations                  1344       1344       1344        1344        1347     1347    1347     1347 
  R
2                                 0.08         0.08        0.08         0.08        0.08      0.08     0.08       0.08    
 Log likelihood           -738.71    -738.71   -738.71   -738.71    -738.71 -738.7 -738.71  -738.71   
 
Notes:The τs are the ancillary parameter estimates of the thresholds or cutpoints that seperate between the 
various outcomes. Standard errors in parenthesis. Variables are arranged by order of significance. Columns 
(2) through (8) progressively omit the least significant variable in previous model.  The final model (8) 












Table 7: Causal Factors in the emergence of Personal Grievance against the State 
 
 




1.        Exclusion from political participation by elite 
 
118 9.18 
2.        Political repression of respondent’s ethnic group  112  9.49 
3.       Marginalization of respondent’s ethnic group in the distribution of  
          Public goods  
330 25.66 
4        Personal economic exclusion, ie, lack of  (or inadequate) 
          Economic access  
60 4.67 
5.      General economic inequality  74  5.75 
6.      Environmental degradation of respondent’s community 
 
324 25.19 
7.       Denial of respondent’s community the right to own and manage oil  
           and      gas resources 
251 19.15 
8.       Others  3  0.23 
Note: Based on respondents’ answers to the questions “As a citizen of Nigeria, do you feel cheated or 
marginalized?” and “Why do you feel cheated/marginalized?”  Source: Author’s Field Survey, March- 
August 2005   
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Table 8: Logit regression on rebel_participation in the “high-risk” sample 
 
                                 (1)       (2)      (3)       (4)        (5)        (6)        (7)         (8)       (9)       (10)       (11) 
oil                            2.87     2.86    2.85    2.79      2.79     2.74      2.66      3.12      3.27     3.30       3.65 
                               (0.89)  (0.89)  (0.88)  (0.87)   (0.87)  (0.86)   (0.86)    (0.78)   (0.81)   (0.79)    (0.73) 
Oilsize                   -0.10     -0.10   -0.10  -0.10     -0.10   -0.10     -0.10     -0.11    -0.10    -0.12      -0.16 
                               (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)   (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)   (0.04)    (0.03)  
government            -0.93    -0.93   -0.90   -0.91    -0.92    -0.94    -0.87     -1.04     -0.95    -0.99      -1.12 
                               (0.48)  (0.48)   (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.42)    (0.41)    (0.39)   (0.38)    (0.36) 
rivers                      -1.53    -1.53    -1.50   -1.44    -1.53   -1.36   -1.42      -1.36      -1.11    -0.78   
                               (0.85)  (0.82)   (0.81)  (0.80)  (0.76)  (0.70)  (0.69)    (0.69)    (0.66)   (0.60)  
hope                        1.65     1.65      1.62     1.75    1.94     1.74     1.81      1.59       1.35            
                               (1.13)  (1.13)    (1.11)  (1.08) (0.97)  (0.92)  (0.91)    (0.86)    (0.87)          
conflict                    0.33    0.33       0.32    0.36     0.36     0.34    0.33      0.29                    
                               (0.23)  (0.23)   (0.23)   (0.22) (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.20)    (0.20) 
distance                   0.04     0.04      0.05     0.04     0.04    0.03    0.04   
                               (0.04)  (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)  (0.03) (0.04)  (0.03)         
infrastructure          -0.05   -0.05    -0.05     -0.05   -0.05   -0.05          
                               (0.06)  (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)                 
ethnic                      -0.49    -0.49   -0.49    -0.32    -0.32                         
                               (0.61)   (0.61)  (0.61)   (0.50)  (0.50)                         
Inclusion                 0.13      0.13     0.14     0.08     
                               (0.25)   (0.24)  (0.24)   (0.20)                                                         
Delta                      -0.43    -0.43    -0.44                                                  
                               (0.89)   (0.88)   (0.88)                                                       
unemployment       -0.09    -0.09                                                 
                               (0.51)   (0.50)                                                         
grievance                0.002                                                           
                               (0.34)                                                                 
Observations          147      147       147     147      147     147     147       147       147         147       147 
R
2                                          0.23
       0.23
        0.23
        0.23
      0.23
      0.23
       0.22
         0.22
         0.20
            0.19
          0.18
    
Log likelihood      -77.2    -77.2   -77.2    -77.3   -77.4   -77.6   -78.0    -78.7    -79.9       -81.1     -82.0   
 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Variables are arranged by order of significance. Columns (2) through (11) 
progressively omit the least significant variable in previous model.  The final model (11) contains only 
variables that are significant at the conventional 5% level. All regressions include an intercept.    38
Table 9: Logit regression on rebel_participation in the “geographically risky” sample 
 
                      (1)           (2)          (3)         (4)       (5)         (6)        (7)         (8)          (9) 
ethnic                            3.48        3.46       3.42      3.64      3.64       3.64       3.41      3.09       2.94 
                                    (1.24)      (1.23)    (1.21)   (0.84)    (0.84)    (0.84)    (0.82)    (0.79)    (0.78) 
income                         -0.32       -0.32     -0.34     -0.34     -0.32     -0.35     -0.35     -0.43     -0.50 
                                    (0.19)      (0.19)    (0.16)   (0.16)    (0.15)     (0.15)   (0.15)    (0.14)    (0.14) 
hope                             1.60         1.73      1.76       1.76      1.84       1.84      1.70      1.81       1.79 
                                (1.24)      (0.60)   (0.59)    (0.59)    (0.58)    (0.58)   (0.56)     (0.55)   (0.55) 
education                     -0.73       -0.71     -0.72     -0.72     -0.73     -0.73     -0.76      -0.73     -0.74 
                                    (0.38)      (0.34)    (0.34)   (0.34)    (0.34)    (0.34)   (0.34)     (0.35)    (0.34) 
studentship                   0.83         0.84      0.76      0.74      0.88       0.92      1.01        0.73    
                                    (0.79)      (0.79)    (0.55)   (0.54)    (0.52)    (0.51)    (0.51)    (0.46)   
assetimmobility           -0.88       -0.88     -0.88     -0.85     -0.91      -0.97    -0.86           
                                    (0.52)      (0.52)    (0.52)    (0.50)   (0.50)     (0.49)   (0.48)           
oilsize                           0.08        0.07       0.07      0.02      0.02        0.02                     
                                    (0.21)      (0.21)    (0.21)    (0.01)   (0.01)    (0.01)                   
marriage                      -0.36        -0.36     -0.37     -0.37    -0.37                           
                                    (0.45)      (0.45)    (0.44)    (0.44)   (0.44)                           
grievance                    -0.18        -0.18     -0.18     -0.18                                  
                                   (0.26)      (0.26)     (0.26)   (0.26)                                  
infrastructure              -0.25       -0.24       -0.22                                          
                                    (0.92)     (0.92)     (0.90)                                          
unemployment             0.12        0.11                                                   
                                    (0.73)     (0.73)                                                  
inclusion                      0.03                                                           
                                   (0.20)                                                          
Observations                223         223        223       223      223        223        223        223       223 
Pseudo R
2                    0.37         0.37       0.37      0.37     0.36       0.36       0.35       0.34     0.33 
Log likelihood            -75.3      -75.3       -75.3    -75.3    -75.6     -75.9      -76.9      -78.5    -79.8 
Notes: Conflict, delta, rivers dropped due to collinearity. Standard errors in parenthesis. Variables are 
arranged by order of significance. Columns (2) through (9) progressively omit the least significant variable 
in previous model.  The final model (9) contains only variables that are significant at the conventional 5% 
level.  
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Table 10: Mean predicted Probability of participation, Standardized coefficients 
and Odds ratios in the three Samples 
 
                                           Overall                                “High-risk”                 “Geographically-risky”         
 
Variable                 β         β
sy         β
s           Odd       β         β
sy       β
s       Odd             β       β
sy      β
s         Odd 
                                                                ratios
                                                      ratios                                       ratios 
                                                                   
                   
income               -0.45    -1.67   -2.35     0.63                                                     -0.50   -1.85  -2.61   0.61    
education            -0.33    -1.22   -0.92     0.72                                                     -0.74   -2.74  -2.06   0.47 
oil               1.68      6.22      -         5.38       3.65    13.52     -       38.36                  
government        -0.31    -1.15   -0.87     0.73      -1.12   -4.15   -3.82   0.33       
distance              0.04      0.15    1.38      1.04         
 p                                        (0.36)                                         (0.43)                                   (0.78) 
NOTE: p is the mean predicted probability of participation, β is an unstandardized coefficient; β
sy* is a y* 
standardized coefficient (where y* is the unobserved latent variable describing the propensity to civil 
disobedience) and β
s* is a fully standardized coefficient.  β
s* is not applicable in the case of binary 
independent variables (Scott, 1997:128-9).  
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 APPENDIX  
                         Table A1 List of Communities Surveyed and characteristics 




1. Elebele  Ogbia  Bayelsa  Yes 
2. Imiringi***  Ogbia  Bayelsa  Yes 
3.   Gbarantoru  Gbaran Ekpetiama  Bayelsa  Yes 
4. Gbaran  Gbaran/Ekpetiama  Bayelsa  No 
5. Odi  Kolokoma/Opukuma  Bayelsa  No 
6. Biseni  Yenogoa  Bayelsa  Yes 
7. Sagbama  Sagbama  Bayelsa  No 
8. Afiesere  Ugheli  North  Delta  Yes 
9. Evremi**  Ugheli  North  Delta  Yes 
10. Ekakpamre  Ugheli  South  Delta  Yes 
11.  Okpare  Ugheli South  Delta  Yes  
12. Obotobo  1**  Burutu  Delta  Yes   
13. Obotobo  2  Burutu  Delta  Yes 
14. Ugbolu  Oshimili  North  Delta  No 
15. Illah  Oshimili  North  Delta  No 
16. Edagberi  Ahaoda  West  Rivers  Yes 
17. Akinima**  Ahaoda  West  Rivers  Yes 
18. Join-Krama  3  Ahaoda  West  Rivers  No 
19. Obrikom  Ogba/Egbema/Ndomi  Rivers  Yes 
20. Mgbede  Ogba/Egbema/Ndomi  Rivers  Yes 
21. Umuebulu  Etche  Rivers  Yes 
22.  Alesa Eleme*  Eleme  Rivers  No  
23. Nkpolu/Irumigbo** Obio/Akpor  Rivers  Yes   
*There was a violent conflict in this community a couple of months after the initial field survey. **These 
communities were not included in the second phase of the field survey.  
 
 